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Case No. 20080930-CA  
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
Don Jacob Setoki, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 Defendant appeals from convictions for unlawful possession of 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor.  This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
 Defendant moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the evidence was 
insufficient for “lack of any kind of physical corroborating evidence.”  Now, on 
appeal, he claims the evidence was insufficient to show his constructive possession 
of drugs and paraphernalia.  Did the trial court plainly err for not sua sponte 
dismissing the State’s case for insufficiency of the evidence to show constructive 
possession? 
 
 
2
 Standard of Review.  To establish plain error, defendant must show (1) that an 
error occurred; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(3) that the error was prejudicial.  See State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ¶ 41, 82 P.3d 1106.   
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
 The following relevant statutes are included in Addendum A:    
 Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2 (West Supp. 2007); 
 Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2007); and 
 Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004).   
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 The State filed an information charging defendant with possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2007), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004).  R7-9.  The 
court conducted a jury trial.  At the close of the State’s evidence, defense counsel 
moved to dismiss.  R150:89.  Counsel asserted, “[I]t would be my motion that the 
lack of any kind of physical corroborating evidence presents the lack . . . of a prima 
facie case.”  R150:89-90.  Counsel elaborated, “There hasn’t been retesting of the 
substance, there hasn’t been fingerprinting, there hasn’t been a recording of the 
statements that are alleged to have been made[,] and there was no contact with the 
registered owners.”  R150:90.  “For those reasons,” counsel “ask[ed] for a directed 
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verdict of not guilty.”  Id.  The trial court denied the motion, finding there was 
“prima facie evidence of the crimes alleged.”  Id. 
 A jury found defendant guilty on both counts.  R83.  On October 9, 2008, the 
trial court entered judgment, sentencing defendant to an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years on the felony count and to an unspecified jail term1 on the 
misdemeanor count, suspending both terms, and placing defendant on probation 
for 24 months. R139-40.  Defendant timely appealed.  R148.    
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The crime 
 On May 5, 2007, Officer Christopher Dowland of the West Valley Police 
Department stopped defendant for speeding.  R150:36-37.  When Officer Dowland 
approached defendant’s car to speak to him, defendant, the only occupant in the 
vehicle, opened his car door.  R150:38.  Defendant said that he did not have his 
                                              
1 The sentencing minutes state that the court imposed a prison term of up to 
five years on defendant’s conviction for drug possession.  R139.  That term was 
suspended.  Id.  As to the conviction for paraphernalia possession, the minutes state 
only the following:  “SENTENCE JAIL SUSPENDED NOTE—The court orders the 
deft receive credit for time served on count 2.”  R140.  No transcript of the 
sentencing hearing is included in the record on appeal.  Adult Probation and Parole 
recommended in its presentence investigation report that defendant “[s]erve 69 
days in the Salt Lake County Jail with credit for 69 days served.”  PSI at 2. 
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driver’s license with him, so Officer Dowland began taking down defendant’s 
information to run a driver’s license check.  Id. 
 As Officer Dowland was gathering the information, he saw defendant reach 
over to the door handle of the car.  R150:38-39.  Inside the handle were cigarettes 
and a small plastic baggie with a substance that appeared to be methamphetamine.  
Id.  As defendant “reached down for the package of cigarettes he also grabbed the 
bagg[ie], [and] put[] it in between his legs.”  R150:39.   
 Upon seeing the baggie, Officer Dowland returned to his police car and called 
for backup.  Id.  When backup arrived, Officer Dowland arrested defendant, telling 
him he was in custody for possession of a controlled substance.  Id.  When Officer 
Dowland asked defendant to exit his car, defendant “grabbed onto the bagg[ie] and 
placed it in between the center console and the driver’s seat.”  R150:39-40.  After 
seating defendant in the police car, Officer Dowland retrieved the baggie.  R150:40.  
He also found a glass pipe “used for ingesting illegal narcotics.”  R150:41-42.   
 Officer Dowland then advised defendant of his Miranda rights.  R150:42.  
Defendant agreed to talk to him.  Id.  Officer Dowland asked defendant how long he 
had been smoking methamphetamine.  Id.  Defendant said that he had “only been 
smoking it for a few days.”  Id.  The officer then asked where defendant had 
purchased the methamphetamine.  Id.  Defendant said “he had purchased it from a 
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friend.”  Id.  Defendant told the officer “he had purchased it for personal use.”  
R150:43. 
 Justin Bechaver, a forensic scientist at the Utah State Crime Laboratory, 
analyzed the substance in the baggie and determined that the substance was 
methamphetamine.  See R150:57, 62; see also R150:41 (stipulation on chain of 
custody).   
The defense 
 Defendant’s father testified on defendant’s behalf.  See R150:80.  He said that 
he owned the car where the drugs were found and that he had lent it to his son on 
the day of the incident.  R150:80-81.  He said that his car needed a new starter and 
sunshade and that two weeks before the incident he had visited an auto yard 
looking for used parts.  R150:82-83.  He said that while removing a sunshade kit, a 
sunglasses case fell down and he thought that he “could do with a second pair of 
sunglasses,” so he took it.  R150:83.   
 When he got home, he opened the case.  R150:84.  Inside he found a small 
plastic pipe and a small packet of “some white substance.”  Id.  He had not “seen 
these things before.”  Id.  Suspecting the white substance was “something that [he 
had] seen people sniff on TV,” he wanted “to keep it away from the reach of 
anybody” until he could dispose of it.  Id.  So he “wrapped it up again in that 
sunglass package and left it in the middle console of the car.”  R150:85. 
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Rebuttal 
 Officer Dowland testified that when he stopped defendant’s car, the 
methamphetamine and the glass pipe were not situated together in one place, but 
were in two different locations within the car.  R150:91.  Moreover, Officer Dowland 
did not “find a sunglass case or anything like that.”  Id.   
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
the charges at trial.  According to defendant, the court should have dismissed the 
charges because the evidence did not establish that he constructively possessed 
either the drugs or paraphernalia found in the car he was driving when he was 
stopped for speeding. 
 Defendant did not raise this claim below.  Thus, his claim succeeds on appeal 
only if he can show plain error, i.e., that an error occurred, that the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court, and that the error was prejudicial.  Because 
defendant cannot show either error or obvious error, defendant’s claim fails. 
 First, defendant’s drug conviction was based on actual possession, not 
constructive possession.  And the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant 
actually possessed the drugs, where the police officer saw defendant handling the 
drugs and defendant admitted to the officer that he had purchased the drugs from a 
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friend for his own use.  Thus, the trial court did not err, let alone obviously err, in 
not dismissing defendant’s drug charge. 
 Second, even if defendant’s drug paraphernalia charge was based on 
constructive possession, the evidence was sufficient to support that charge.  
Specifically, defendant’s occupancy of the car, the connection between defendant 
and the drugs found in the car, defendant’s admission that he had purchased the 
drugs for his own use, and the pipe’s location in the car with the drugs all 
supported a finding that defendant constructively possessed the pipe.  Thus, the 
trial court also did not err, let alone obviously err, in not dismissing defendant’s 
paraphernalia charge.  
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR OR PLAINLY ERR FOR 
NOT DISMISSING AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE’S CASE-IN-
CHIEF; THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SHOW ACTUAL POSSESSION OF DRUGS AND 
CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
 Defense counsel moved to dismiss both charges at the close of the State’s case, 
claiming that the State had not presented sufficient evidence sufficient to support 
them because it had presented no physical evidence corroborating Officer 
Dowland’s testimony.  R150:89-90 (motion to dismiss and ruling on motion—
attached as Addendum B).    Specifically, counsel noted that “[t]here hasn’t been 
retesting of the substance, there hasn’t been fingerprinting, there hasn’t been a 
recording of the statements that are alleged to have been made and there was no 
contact with the registered owner.”  R150:90 (attached as part of Addendum B—
motion to dismiss and ruling on motion).  The trial court denied the motion.  Id.   
 On appeal, defendant again claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the charges.  Br. Appellant at 1-2.  But defendant no longer claims a lack of 
physical evidence corroborating Officer Dowland’s testimony.  See id. at 7-13.  
Rather, defendant now claims that “there was insufficient evidence to establish that 
[defendant] had constructive possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia.”  Br. 
Appellant at 7 (boldface and capitalization omitted).   
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 Preservation and plain error.  To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant's 
objection “must be sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial 
court.” State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63,¶ 13, 95 P.3d 276. (quotations and citation omitted). 
This means that a defendant “must enter an objection on the record that is both 
timely and specific.” State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App.1993). “The 
objection must ‘be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error’ of 
which [the party] complains.” State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App.1998) 
(quoting Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App.1996) 
(quotation and citation omitted). This preservation rule “applies to every claim, 
including constitutional questions.” State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346.  
And, if a defendant does not preserve his claim below, this Court may review his 
claim only for plain error.  Id. at ¶ 11. 
 Defendant brought a motion to dismiss below.  The motion, however, rested 
on his claim that the State had not met its burden to prove the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt because it had not presented any physical evidence corroborating 
Officer Dowland’s testimony concerning defendant’s guilt.  Thus, defendant claims 
for the first time on appeal that the State had not proved constructive possession.  
Because defendant did not raise this specific claim below, defendant can only obtain 
review of his claim by demonstrating plain error.  Id.  In other words, defendant 
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must show (1) that error occurred, (2) that it should have been obvious, and (3) that 
it was harmful.  See Casey, 2003 UT 55, ¶ 41.   
 Defendant cannot prevail on his plain error claim.  First, he cannot show 
error.2  Second, even if he could show error, he could not show that it was obvious.   
 Standard of review.  “[I]f upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that 
can be reasonably drawn from it, the court concludes that some evidence exists from 
which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, [the court] will uphold the denial of a motion to 
dismiss.”  State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ¶ 41, 70 P.3d 111 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  “When evaluating whether the State produced sufficient 
believable evidence to withstand a challenge at the close of the State’s case in chief, 
[the reviewing court] appl[ies] the same standard used when reviewing a jury 
verdict.”  Id.  The court looks at the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the State and will dismiss 
                                              
2Defendant argued that he had preserved his claim, see Br. Appellant at 2, but 
argued plain error in the alternative, see id. at 9.  The State treats defendant’s claim 
as unpreserved and addresses it under the plain error doctrine.  Defendant could 
not prevail, however, even if his claim were preserved, because he has not shown 
any error, let alone obvious error.   
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“for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime.”  State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 
¶ 15, 63 P.3d 94 (citation omitted). 
 When an insufficiency claim is brought under the plain error doctrine, a 
defendant must show not only “that the evidence was insufficient to support [his] 
conviction,” but “that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the 
trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury.”  Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 17. 
 Elements of the offenses.  To prove possession of a controlled substance, the 
State must establish that defendant “knowingly and intentionally . . . possess[ed] or 
use[d] . . . a controlled substance.”  Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 
2007).  To prove possession of drug paraphernalia, the State must show that 
defendant knowingly and intentionally “use[d], or [] possess[ed] with intent to use, 
drug paraphernalia.”  Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004); State v. Layman, 1999 
UT 79, ¶ 13, 985 P.2d 911.   
 Possession.  “’Possession,’’’ for purposes of Utah’s drug and drug 
paraphernalia laws, “means the joint or individual ownership, control, occupancy, 
holding, retaining, belonging [or] maintaining . . . of controlled substances.” See 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(ii) (West Supp. 2007).   Where the defendant is found in  
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actual possession of drugs or paraphernalia, the State may prove possession by 
showing that the defendant “individually possessed, used, or controlled” the drugs 
or paraphernalia.  See id. 
 However, where the defendant is not in actual physical possession of the 
drugs or paraphernalia, but the contraband is found under circumstances 
suggesting his possession, the State must show that the defendant constructively 
possessed the contraband.  1999 UT 79, ¶ 13.  To establish constructive possession, 
the State must show “a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drugs [or 
paraphernalia] to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the 
intent to exercise dominion or control over the drugs [or paraphernalia].”  Layman, 
1999 UT 79, ¶ 13; see also Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(ii).  “[T]he existence of a 
sufficient nexus to prove constructive possession is a highly fact-sensitive 
determination.”  Id. at 14.  And, while no list of factors is always relevant, several of 
the following factors may be useful in determining whether a sufficient nexus exists: 
(1) “ownership and/or occupancy of the . . . vehicle where the drugs were found, “ 
(2) “presence of a defendant at the time the drugs were found,” (3) a “defendant’s 
proximity to the drugs,” (4) a defendant’s “previous drug use,” (5) “incriminating 
statements or behavior,” and (6) “presence of drugs in a specific areas where the 
defendant had control.”  State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ¶ 32, 122 P.3d 639 (citing 
State v. Anderson, 668 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Utah 1983)).  Furtive movements may also 
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support a finding of constructive possession.  See United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 
1009, 1016 (10th Cir. 2006).  Testimony that a defendant may have placed something 
in the spot where the police later found an item can support a finding that the 
defendant possessed the item.  See United States v. Flenoid, 718 F.2d 867, 868 (8th Cir. 
1983).  Even where a relevant factor does not by itself establish a sufficient nexus 
between a defendant and contraband, the cumulative effect of multiple factors can.  
See Workman, 2005 UT 66, ¶ 35.  
A. Defendant actually possessed methamphetamine.   
 As stated, actual “possession” or “use” means “the joint or individual 
ownership, control, . . . [or] holding” of such substances.  See Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-2 (West Supp. 2007).  Here, the evidence sufficed to show that defendant actually 
controlled the methamphetamine upon which his drug charge was based.  Officer 
Dowland testified that he saw the baggie containing the methamphetamine in the 
door handle and that he saw defendant “grab[] the bagg[ie], [and] put[] it in 
between his legs.  R150:39.  When the officer asked defendant to exit the car, he saw 
defendant “grab[] onto the bagg[ie] and place[] it in between the center console and 
the driver’s seat.”  R150:39-40.   Thus, the officer saw defendant actually possessing 
the controlled substance.  In addition, defendant told the officer that “he had 
purchased [the methamphetamine] from a friend.”  R150:42.  The officer’s testimony 
on the matter was also evidence of actual possession.  The testimony demonstrated 
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that defendant owned the methamphetamine.  Given this evidence that defendant 
actually possessed the methamphetamine, the trial court did not err, let alone 
obviously err, in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of constructive 
possession.  
B. Defendant constructively possessed the glass 
methamphetamine pipe. 
 Moreover, the nexus between defendant and the drug paraphernalia was 
sufficient “to permit an inference that [defendant] had both the power and the intent 
to exercise dominion and control” over that item.  Layman, 1999 UT 79, ¶ 13. 
 As stated, “the existence of a sufficient nexus to prove constructive possession 
is a highly fact-sensitive determination.”  Layman, 1999 UT 79, ¶ 14.  Relevant factors 
may include (1) “ownership and/or occupancy of the . . . vehicle where the drugs 
were found, “ (2) “presence of a defendant at the time the drugs were found,” (3) a 
“defendant’s proximity to the drugs,” (4) a defendant’s “previous drug use,” (5) 
“incriminating statements or behavior,” and (6) “presence of drugs in a specific 
areas where the defendant had control.”  Workman, 2005 UT 66, ¶ 32 (citing 
Anderson, 668 P.2d at 1264).   
 Here, the evidence established a sufficient nexus.  Defendant was present and 
was the only occupant of the vehicle where the methamphetamine and the glass 
pipe were found.  R150:38.  Thus, at the time, he was in sole control of the car and 
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the areas within the car.  Moreover, defendant admitted that he actually possessed 
the methamphetamine, that he had been using methamphetamine for several days, 
and that he had purchased the methamphetamine for his own use.  See R150:42-43.  
And Officer Dowland testified that the pipe could be used to smoke narcotics.  
R150:42.  Under these circumstances, the evidence also sufficed to permit an 
inference that defendant had both the power and intent to exercise control over the 
paraphernalia.   
 Finally, even if the evidence was insufficient to show constructive possession 
of the pipe, that insufficiency was not obvious.  As stated, the pipe was found with 
drugs in a car in which defendant was the sole occupant, defendant admitted he 
intended to use the drugs for his own use, and the pipe was a means by which to 
use those drugs.  Under these circumstances, any insufficiency in the evidence to 
establish constructive possession of the pipe would not have been obvious.   
 In sum, defendant has not established that the trial court erred or plainly 
erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges in this case.  Thus, defendant’s 
plain error claim fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
 Respectfully submitted June 2, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
 
JEANNE B. INOUYE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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